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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is an appeal from a grant of summary judgment entered by the District Court 
on July 6 ,  2007, dismissing the negligence claiins brought by plaintiffs Ray Harrison ("plaintiff' 
or "Mr. Harrison") and Julie Anderson1 against D. Lee Binnion, M.D. ("defendant" or 
"Dr. Binnion"), and the District Court's subsequent Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration, entered September 27, 2007. The District Court ruled on 
summary judgment that there was insufficient evidence that the emergency medical care 
provided by Dr. Binnion caused any injury to Mr. Harrison, and that there was no chain of 
circumstances from which such a causal nexus could be inferred. R. Val. 11, p. 299. In addition, 
the District Court concluded that plaintiffs expert's opinion on the issue of causation was 
speculative. R., Val. 11, p. 299. Following plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration, which was 
heard on September 20,2007, the District Court stood by its earlier order, concluding that there 
had not been "an adequate evidentiary showing that Dr. Biimion's alleged conduct caused any 
damages." R., Vol. 11, p. 31 1. Accordingly, the District Court held that the prior order granting 
summary judgment would remain undisturbed, and the plaintiffs claims against Dr. Binnion 
would be dismissed as a matter of law. 
At the time their Complaint was filed, Mr. Hamson and Ms. Anderson claimed to be 
married at common law. The two were formally married after commencement of this lawsuit. 
The sole appellant in this matter, however, is Mr. Harrison, as Mrs. Harrison did not join in the 
Notice of Appeal filed October 30,2007 (R., Val. 11, p. 313). Although the Complaint was 
prosecuted by both Mr. and Mrs. Harrison, for purposes of continuity herein, all subsequent 
references in Respondent's Brief will refer to plaintiff Ray Harrison in the singular. 
B. Course of the Proceedings. 
Plaintiff filed his original Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial on April 28, 
2004. R., Vol. I, p. 22. Following a lengthy discovery process, plaintiff sought leave to file his 
First Amended Complaint on November 15,2005. R., Vol. 1, p. 116. The scope of the requested 
amendment was subsequently expanded, and plaintiff sought to add a claim for punitive damages 
against both St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center ("SARMC") and Jeffrey Hartford, M.D., in 
addition to his motion to add a claim for negligent credeiltialing against SARMC. On May 18, 
2006, the District Court issued its decision denying the motion as against SARMC and granting 
leave to request punitive damages against Dr. Hartford. R., Val. I, p. 183. Dr. Hartford entered 
into a settlement agreement shortly thereafter with plaintiff and was dismissed from the case. R., 
Val. 11, p. 249. Litigation continued between plaintiff and defendants Dr. Binnion and SARMC. 
Upon completing discovery, including the depositions of plaintiffs designated 
expert witnesses, Dr. Binnion filed a Motion for Sumnary Jud,ment seeking dismissal of 
plaintiffs claims. R., Vol. 11, p. 264. The motion was opposed, and following oral argument, 
the District Court entered its Order Granting Summary Judgment to D. Lee Binnion on July 6, 
2007 (see R., Voi. 11, p. 280), on multiple grounds: first, that plaintiff had failed to establish the 
necessary foundation for the opinion testimony of his standard of care expert, Dr. Paul Navar; 
and secondly, that there was no admissible evidence that any alleged breach of the local standard 
of care caused Mr. Harrison's injuries. R., Vol. 11, p. 294. 
Plaintiff moved the District Court for reconsideration on July 26, 2007. R., 
Val. 11, p. 301. The Motion for Reconsideration was heard on September 20,2007, and one 
week later the District Court issued its Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Reconsideration. R., Vol. 11, p. 310. While the District Court granted 
reconsideration of its earlier order excluding plaintiffs expert, Paul Navar, M.D., from 
testifying, the court nevertheless denied reconsideration of its decision granting summary 
judgment on the issue of causation. R., Vol. 11, p. 31 1. Accordingly, Judgment was entered in 
favor of both Dr. Binnion and SARMC on September 27,2007 (R., Vol. 11, p. 307), and the 
plaintiffs Notice of Appeal was filed on October 30,2007. R., Vol. 11, p. 3 13. 
C. Statement of Facts. 
The underlying facts of this case have been undisputed with virtually no 
exception. In her Order Granting Summary Judgment to D. Lee Binnion, Judge Copsey set forth 
an accurate summary of the undisputed facts that had been presented by the parties in the 
materials supporting and opposing summary judgment. See R., Vol. 11, p. 281, L. 21 - p. 284, 
L. 17. Because the referenced summary of facts by Judge Copsey was taken from the materials 
submitted by the parties in prior proceedings before the District Court, and because the following 
facts as summarized by Judge Copsey have been undisputed-both below and now on appeal- 
they are set forth in pertinent part herein for convenience to the Court. 
Mr. Harrison sought treatment from his wife's physician, Dr. Minas, on 
November 14,2003, at approximately 3:00 p.m. R., Vol. 11, p. 281. Blood was drawn and a 
physical examination conducted, and Dr. Minas recommended that Mr. I-Iarrison seek treatment 
at the emergency room. Id. Mr. Harrison nevertheless returned to his home against the advice of 
Dr. Minas, following which Dr. Minas received the results of the blood panels drawn earlier that 
afternoon, revealing that Mr. Harrison's serum sodium level was extremely low: 1 i 1 
milliequivalentslliter (mEq1L.). Id. Dr. Minas then contacted Mr. Harrison and told him to go to 
the hospital emergency rooin for further treatment. Id., p. 282. 
Mr. Harrison presented at the SARMC Emergency Department at approximately 
11:35 p.m. on November 14, 2003, with symptoms of vomiting, diarrhea, imbalance, dizziness 
and speech impairment. R., Val. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 17 (Affidavit of Eric S. Rossman in Support 
of Plaintiffs' Motions to Amend for Punitive Damages), Exhibit 1 (SARMC medical records), 
Bates Nos. 000561,000564. According to Mr. Harrison's family, he had been going "downhill" 
for the preceding seven weeks, with "episodes of vomiting and diarrhea three or four times a 
day." Id., Bates No. 000561. According to the history provided by Mrs. Harrison to the 
SARMC Emergency Department, Mr. Hamson's condition had significantly deteriorated: 
It has gotten to the point where he has gotten so weak over the past 
three to four days that he stumbles and reels when he tries to stand 
up. He looks like he is staggering. He is increasingly lightheaded 
every time he stands up, although he has not had any syncopal 
episodes, and for the past three days according to hk wife, he has 
not had anything to eat or drink outside of alcohol. It got so severe 
that she finally convinced him to go see Dr. Minas today, who saw 
him in the office and told him that his electrolytes were out of 
balance, sent him home, but then called back a couple of hours 
later and said that he needed to come in and be admitted. 
When Mr. Hamson presented to the Emergency Department, the nurses 
immediately drew blood for necessary chemistry panels. Id., Bates No. 000563,000565. 
According to the Emergency Department records, Dr. Binnion began her care and 
treatment of Mr. Harrison at 12:49 a.m. on November 5,2003. Id., Bates No. 000568. The 
blood chemistry panels revealed that Mr. Harrison's serum sodium had decreased further, from 
11 1 mEq./L at 3:00 p.m. on November 14, to 96 mEqIL. by shortly after midnight on 
November 15. Id., Bates Nos. 000234,000561-000568. Dr. Binnion ordered administration of 
normal saline, noting specifically in the chart that "I think that his sodium has taken quite some 
time to get this low, and I do not want to replace it too quickly as that could cause cerebral 
edema." Id., Bates No. 000562. Dr. Binnion then ordered a "them.-7" blood panel to be 
performed every six hours in order to monitor Mr. Harrison's sodium replacement. See id. 
Dr. Bimion saw Mr. Harrison again in the emergency department at 
approximately 2:35 a.m. on November 15. Id., Bates No. 000568. By that time, Mr. Harrison's 
vital signs were within normal ranges. See id., Bates No. 000566. Dr. Bimion spoke with 
Dr. Hartford, who was the physician on call for Mr. Harrison's treating physician, Dr. Minas, 
and recommended that Harrison be admitted to SARMC. R., Vol. 11, p. 327, Exhibit 25 
(Affidavit of Patricia M. Olsson in Support of D. Lee Binnion, M.D.'s Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment Re: Negligence Claims), Exhibit C (Deposition of D. Lee Bimion, M.D.), 
p. 104, LL. 13-21. There is no dispute that Dr. Binnion, as an emergency department physician, 
did not have admitting privileges at SARMC. R., Vol. 11, p. 282. In fact, plaintiffs own 
emergency physician expert testified that as an emergency room physician he does not have 
admitting privileges, and that traditionally an emergencypkysician's responsibility ends when 
the patient is admitted by a treating physician. R., Vol. 11, p. 327, Exhibit 25, Exhibit A 
(Deposition Transcript of Paul Navar, M.D.), p. 23, LL. 1-16. As a result, it was necessary for 
Dr. Binnion to consult with the treating physician, obtain his order for admission, and then 
prepare that order for the treating physician. 
Dr. Hartford agreed that Mr. Harrison should be admitted, and Dr. Binnion 
initially suggested that Mr. Harrison be admitted to the telemetry floor, noting that because 
Mr. Harrison "really looked pretty good" considering his condition, he would be alright "on the 
floor with the general medical treatment." R., Val. 11, p. 327, Exhibit 25, Exhibit C, p. 11 1, 
LL. 8-1 7. Dr. Hartford recommended against admission to the telemetry floor because, in his 
opinion, the telemetry floor presented risks of overstimulus given Mr. Harrison's detoxification 
from alcohol. Id., p. 11 1, LL. 18-25. Once it was decided that Mr. Harrison should be admitted 
to the medical floor, Dr. Binnion specifically informed Dr. Hartford of the need for continued 
sodium replacement at 200 CCs per hour normal saline, and that chemical labs were being taken 
every six hours, which would need monitoring on a regular basis. See id., p. 112, L. 1 - p. 113, 
L. 1. 
Mr. Harrison was admitted to SARMC at 3:26 a.m. on November 15, 2003. R., 
Val. 11, P. 326, Exhibit 17, Exhibit 1, Bates Nos. 000567-000568. Upon Mr. Harrison's 
admission to SARMC, and according to plaintiffs' own expert, Dr. Binnion's responsibility for 
the care and treatment of Mr. Harrison then transferred to Dr. Hartford. R., Val. 11, p. 327, 
Exhibit A, p. 23, LL. 1-16. 
11. ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I .  Whether the District Court correctly determined that plaintiff failed to 
present admissible evidence that, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, Dr. Binnion caused 
Harrison's CPM. 
111. ADDITIONAL ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Dr. Binnion is entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
The District Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Binnion. 
On this appeal, plaintiff attempts to distract the Court with irrelevant issues and facts, coupled 
with emotional language and argument. However, the Court will surely focus on the important 
issues and applicable argument; namely, that plaintiffs expert testified that he could not say to a 
reasonable degree of medical certainty that Dr. Binnion caused Mr. Harrison's injuries, and that 
therefore, Dr. Binnion was entitled to summary judgment. 
A. Standard of Review. 
Upon review of an order of the District Court granting summary judgment, the 
standard of review is the same standard used by the District Court in ruling on the motion. 
Watson v. Weick, 141 Idaho 500,504, 112 P.3d 788,792 (2005). Summary judgment is 
appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." IDAHO R. CIV. P. 56(c). If there is no genuine issue 
of material fact, "only a question of law remains, over which this Court exercises free review." 
Watson, 141 Idaho at 504. 
In addition, a "nonmoving party's failure to make a showing sufficient to 
establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, on which that party will bear 
the burden of proof at trial, requires the entry of summary judgment." Jarman v. f i le ,  122 
Idaho 952,955-56,842 P.2d 288,291-92 (Ct. App. 1992). The nonmoving party is further 
required to set forth specific facts, by affidavit of otherwise (and not mere conclusions), from 
admissible record evidence, in order to show a genuine issue of material fact. See Verbillis v. 
Dependable Appliance Co., 107 Idaho 335,337,689 P.2d 227,229 (Ct. App. 1984). 
B. The District Court Was Correct in Granting Summary Judgment Since 
Plaintiff Failed To Present Admissible Evidence that Dr. Binnion's Care and 
Treatment of Ray Harrison Caused the Alleged Injury. 
Plaintiff argues on appeal that the District Court erred in granting summary 
judgment to Dr. Birmion (Appellant's Brief, p. 8), insisting that the testimony of his standard of 
care expert, Dr. Navar, establishes a genuine issue of material fact whether Dr. Binnion's alleged 
breaches of the local standard of care "were a substantial factor in causing the condition of 
Central Pontine Myelinolysis ("CPM") in Mr. Harrisonn (id., p. 46). Dr. Binnion is alleged to 
have breached the local standard of care by: (a) failing to slow the rate of sodium replacement; 
(b) failing to communicate within her physician's orders her concerns about rapid sodium 
elevation and that all lab values be immediately reported to the attending physician; and 
(c) failing to ensure that Mr. Harrison was admitted to the Intensive Care Unit. See id., pp. 46, 
50,51. These precise arguments were presented to the District Court and each was denied as a 
matter of law. Even assuming for purposes of summary judgment that Dr. Navar's testimony 
concerning the alleged breaches of the local standard of care was correct, neither he nor 
plaintiffs causation expert, Dr. Robert Laureno, were able to testify to a reasonable degree of 
medical certainty that such breaches caused Mr. Harrison to develop CPM. Given plaintiffs 
failure to establish the essential element of causation, entry of summary judgment was not only 
proper, but required 
1. Given the complexity of the medical issues in this case, admissible 
expert testimony establishing causation is required. 
The District Court originally granted Dr. Binnion's Motion for Summary 
Judgment on the grounds that plaintiff had "failed to produce admissible expert evidence that, to 
a reasonable degree of medical certainty, Dr. Binnion caused Harrison's CPM. . . ." and because 
"there was no chain of circumstances from which causation reasonably could be inferred." R., 
Vol. 11, pp. 297,299. Summary judgment had also been granted because plaintiff had failed to 
establish the necessary foundation for the opinion testimony of Dr. Paul Navar. On plaintiffs 
Motion for Reconsideration, the District Court reversed its earlier decision on whether there was 
a sufficient foundation for Dr. Navar's opinions and reserved that issue for the time of trial. R., 
Vol. 11, p. 31 1. However, the District Court left in place its earlier grant of summary judgment 
because, even assuming that plaintiff had demonstrated evidence of a breach of the local 
standard of care, he nevertheless failed to provide expert witness testimony establishing that the 
alleged breach, i.e., Dr. Binnion's actions that raised Mr. Harrison's sodium level from 96 
mEq./L at 12:49 a.m. to 105 mEq./L at 6:00 a.m., was in itself sufficient to cause the resulting 
CPM. Given Mr. Harrison's life-threatening hyponatremia, the treatment of which is 
complicated enough without the added factor of plaintiffs alcohol toxicity and corresponding 
risk of seizures, and the eventual developmellt of central pontine myelinolysis, this case is 
complicated both factually and medically, and expert witness testimony is necessary in order to 
establish the central element of causation. 
It is well-settled under Idaho law that, the more complicated the case, the more 
likely expert testimony on causation will be required. This rule holds particularly true in cases of 
alleged medical malpractice. In Swallow v. Emergency Medicine of Idaho, P.A., 138 Idaho 589, 
67 P.3d 68 (2003), this Court clarified its earlier ruling in Sheridan v. St. Luke's Regional 
Medical Center, 135 Idaho 775,25 P.3d 88 (2001), which had stated in dicta that expert 
testimony regarding causation in a medical malpractice case was not required.' The Swallow 
court was very deliberate in distinguishing the Sheridan case, noting that when it issued the 
earlier decision, it 
did not hold that expert testimony is never necessary in order to 
prove causation in a medical malpractice case. We simply held 
that expert testimony that the nurses' negligence was a proximate 
cause of the child's injuries was not required under thefacts of 
that particular case. 
Id. (emphasis added). Thus, this Court expressly limited the Sheridan holding. 
* The Sheridan case concerned a newborn who went untreated for jaundice, and his 
hyperbilirubinaeinia eventually led to cerebral palsy. In that case, there was a direct chain 
formed, linking the nurses' negligence, the child's untreated jaundice (which was untreated for 
various reasons) and his development of cerebral palsy. Specifically, the nurses did not notify 
the child's pediatrician during the first 24 hours of life that the child was jaundiced, nor that 
bilirubin tests had not been conducted; did not chart indicia that could have been used to trace 
the jaundice's progress, and did not note the possible blood incompatibility between mother and 
child. Moreover, nursing staff failed to warn the child's parents, upon discharge, that the 
jaundice he had might not be normal. 
There is ample precedent, however, supporting the proposition that expert medical 
testimony on causation is necessary in the clear majority of cases of alleged medical malpractice. 
For example, the Swallow court reviewed several prior decisions where this Court held that lay 
people (and by way of extension, jurors) were not qualified to reach conclusions regarding 
causation. See id. at 597-98,67 P.3d at 76-77 (citing Bloching v. Albertson 's, Inc., 129 Idaho 
844, 934 P.2d 17 (1997) (holding that a lay person was not qualified to testify that his seizures 
were caused by using an insulin blend); Evans v. Twin Falls County, 118, Idaho 210,796 P.2d 87 
(1990) (lay person not qualified to testify that deputies grabbing and shaking his wife caused her 
death via cardiac arrest eleven months later); Flowerdew v. Warner, 90 Idaho 164,409 P.2d 110 
(1965) (lay personlpatient not qualified to testify that his injury was caused by the medical 
treatment he received)). The Swallow court also favorably quoted AM. JUR. 2D's well-reasoned 
analysis in Expert and Opinion Evidence: 
Where the subject matter regarding the cause of disease, injury, or 
death of a person is wholly scientific or so far removed from the 
usual and ordinary experience of the average person that expert 
knowledge is essential to the formation of an intelligent opinion, 
only an expert can competently give opinion evidence as to the 
cause of death, disease, or physical condition. 
Swallow, 138 Idaho at 598,67 P.3d at 77 (quoting 3 1A AM. JUR. 2~ Expert & Opinion Evidence 
207) (emphasis added). 
In Swallow, the issue was whether Swallow's lieart attack was caused by taking a 
large and improperly-prescribed dose of the antibiotic Cipro. There, this Court affirmed the 
district court's conclusion that the lack of expert testimony regarding causation was fatal to 
plaintiffs claim against one of the physician defendants. Specifically, the court held: 
Whether or not the Cipro taken by Mr. Swallow was a cause of 
his heart attack is a matter of science that is far removed from 
the usual and ordinary experience of the averageperson. A jury, 
comprised of lay people, is simply not qualified to determine that 
issue without the assistance of expert testiinony establishing that 
Cipro can cause a myocardial infarction. Absent such testimony, 
any finding in that regard would be based upon speculation. In 
granting the motion for summary judgment, the district court 
wrote, "[I]n this case without some reliable expert testimony 
relating Cipro to myocardial infarction, there is no chain of 
circumstances from which causation reasonably could be inferred." 
The district court did not err in granting Dr. Blahd's motion for 
summary judgment. 
Swallow, 138 Idaho at 598, 67 P.3d at 77 (emphasis added). 
Here, plaintiff bears the burden of proof in establishing that the care and treatment 
administered by Dr. Binnion caused him to develop CPM. Just as in Swallow, the question here 
whether a rise in serum sodium levels from 96 to 105 mEq./L over a six-hour period is sufficient 
to eventually cause CPM "is a matter of science that is far removed from the usual and ordinary 
experience of the average person." In fact, as will be shown below, whether Dr. Binnion's 
treatment of Mr. Harrison over a two hour and forty minute period caused him to develop CPM 
is a question that plaintiffs own experts cannot answer. Because plaintiff's experts were unable 
to make a causal connection between defendant's care and plaintiffs injuries, there is no 
admissible evidence of causation. Without evidence of causation, plaintiff cannot as a matter of 
law meet his burden in going forward, there can be no genuine issue of material fact, and 
summary judgment must be granted, a result that should occur regardless of how vehemently his 
experts assert their opinions. 
2. Both of plaintiff's medical experts testified that they did not know 
whether the rise in Mr. Harrison's sodium level from 96 mEq.lL. at 
12:49 a.m. to 105 mEq./L. at 6:00 a.m. caused Mr. Harrison to 
develop CPM. 
a. Dr. Laureno. 
The main argument advanced by plaintiff on appeal is premised upon a 
misreading of the testimony offered by his experts. Plaintiff argues that the "primary basis" for 
Judge Copsey's decision was "that Dr. Laureno . . . testified that, had the rate of sodium 
replacement been slowed considerably at 6:00 a.m. when the lab report showed a sodium level 
of 105, he could not say that it was more likely than not that Mr. Harrison would have suffered 
from CPM." Appellant's Brief, pp. 45-46 (emphasis added) (citing R., Vol. 11, pp. 295-99). A 
review of the cited portion of the District Court's order, however, shows that plaintiffs argument 
is an incomplete representation of both the record and Dr. Laureno's testimony. The District 
Court's order cited to pages 123-24 of Dr. Laureno's testimony, where he was asked to address 
the change in Mr. Harrison's sodium level between 12:49 a.m. and 6:00 a.m. on November 15, 
2003, and whether the increase from 96 mEq./L to 105 mEq./L during that six hour period "was 
a substantial factor in causing his CPM." (Emphasis added.) R., Vot. 11, p. 327, Exhibit 25, 
Exhibit B (Deposition Transcript of Robert Laureno, M.D.), p. 123, LL. 7-25. Thus, the focus of 
the question presented to Dr. Laureno did not involve a change in sodium replacement at (and 
followillg) 6:00 a.m.; instead, the call of the question clearly focused upon the rise in 
Mr. Harrison's sodium level between 12:49 and 6:00 am.-the period of time that includes the 
two hours and forty minutes in which Mr. Harrison was under Dr. Binnion's care. Speaking to 
that period of time and the corresponding elevation in sodium levels, Dr. Laureno testified that "I 
can't say with certainty that this change, without any subsequent change, would have resulted 
in any CPM." Id., p. 124, LL. 8-16 (emphasis added). The fact that Dr. Laureno expressly 
differentiated between "this change" (i.e., the change in sodium levels between 12:49 and 6:OO) 
and "any subsequent change" (i.e., after 6:OO) very clearly indicates that he understood the 
limited scope of the question, and he testified that he could not make a causal connection 
between the treatment rendered by Dr. Binnion and the CPM that developed thereafter. Plaintiff, 
on the other hand, has attempted to direct this Court's attention to the period of time after 6:00, 
suggesting that the underlying issue was whether "the CPM might have been prevented had the 
sodium replacement been slowed considerably at 6:00 a.m." Appellant's Brief, p. 46 (emphasis 
added). Dr. Laureno's testimony cited above, however, was limited strictly to the sodium levels 
for which Dr. Binnion was responsible, and he plainly stated that he could not state with any 
certainty, much less a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the change between 12:49 and 
6:00 "would have resulted in any CPM." 
b. Dr. Navar. 
Having failed to establish a causal nexus through Dr. Laureno's testimony 
plaintiff has attempted to convince this Court, just as he attempted to convince the District Court, 
that Dr. Navar (his standard of care expert) nevertheless offered a sufficient opinion on the issue 
of causation. See Appellant's Brief, pp. 46-49. In support of this position, plaintiff has pointed 
to Dr. Navar's "testimony" that "Dr. Binnion's breach of the prevailing local standard of care as 
identified above was a substantial factor in causing the condition of Central Pontine Myelinolysis 
in Mr. Harrison." R., Vol. 11, p. 327, Exhibit 25, Exhibit A, p. 50, LL. 11-14. Dr. Navar had 
been disclosed as a standard of care expeit, but since plaintiff raised the issue of causation in his 
expert disclosure of Dr. Navar, defendant explored his apparent opinion on this topic as well, 
eliciting the following testimony: 
Q. Okay. And I'd like you to -well, we know that the sodium 
was continued at 200 cc's from 6 a.m. to 12:27 at which 
point he had reached a sodium level of 110. 
Now, by that point, Doctor, Dr. Hartford had been in to see 
the patient, had he not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. Would you agree with me that at that point in time, 
the responsibility for the patient had transferred to 
Dr. Hartford? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. Would you agree with me that if the sodium 
administration had been stopped or decreased at that point 
in time, that the likelihood of Mr. Harrison getting CPM 
would have decreased greatly? 
A. I don't know the answer to that question. 
Q. What would you need to know to answer the question? 
A. I don't know whether that initial increase from 96 to 110 
over a 12-hour period would have been enough to result in 
the insult just by itself. 
Q. And that was 14 milliequivalents in approximately a 12- 
hour period of time? 
A. Right. 
0 .  Okav. How about the 9 millieauivalent increase in the . A 
approximate six-hour period of time from 0049 to 6 a.m., 
would that in and o f  itself have been enough to cause 
CPM in Mr. Harrison? 
A. I don 't know. 
See id., p. 105, L. 17-p. 106, L. 20 (emphasis added). 
Dr. Navar, like Dr. Laureno, offered testimony that dealt solely with the change in 
Mr. Harrison's sodium levels between 12:49 and 6:00 a.m., and like Dr. Laureno, Dr. Navar 
stated that he did not know if the change during Dr. Binnion's care could have caused CPM in 
Mr. Harrison. Since neither of plaintiffs experts is able to offer testimony establishing to a 
reasonable degree of medical certainty that the rise in Mr. Harrison's sodium level while under 
Dr. Binnion's care caused plaintiff to develop CPM, plaintiff has failed to establish an essential 
element of his case, and entry of summary judgment is required. 
3. The analysis suggested by plaintiff under Newberry v. Martens is 
misplaced since the testimony of Dr. Laureno indicates that there was 
a single cause for Mr. Harrison's CPM. 
Hoping to avoid the legal effect of his failure to provide medical evidence on the 
issue of causation, plaintiff has once again turned to Newberry v. Martens, 142 Idaho 284, 127 
P.3d 187 (2005), arguing that there are multiple possible causes at issue in this case, and that 
therefore the proper standard is the "substantial factor" analysis. See Appellant's Brief, pp. 47- 
49. In support of this argument, plaintiff has endeavored to create separate "causative factors" 
(i.e., Dr. Binnion's "failure to slow the rate of sodium replacement," her "failure to communicate 
concerns that lab values be reported immediately," and her "failure to ensure that Mr. Harrison 
was admitted to the ICU"). However, each of these "separate" theories may be reduced to a 
single, common factor: each claimed breach, if true, resulted in the same increase in plaintiffs 
sodium levels that were attributed to Dr. Binnion elsewhere. As such, the "separate" factors 
were, in reality, merely restatements of the same alleged causative factor. 
Plaintiff argued to the District Court that "Dr. Laureno testified there was no 
other cause of the CPM than the rapid elevation of the sodium level in Mr. Harrison's case," 
which representation undermines the "substantial factor" position taken by plaintiff on appeal 
R., Vol. 11, p. 327, Exhibit 31 (Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant D. Lee 
Binnion's Motion for Partial Summary. Judgment), p. 11 (emphasis added). See also R., Val. 11, 
p. 327, Exhibit 30, Exhibit A (Deposition Transcript of Robert Laureno, M.D.), p. 50, LL. 9-18. 
Counsel for plaintiff made similar representations at the summary judgment hearing, arguing 
clearly that according to both Dr. Laureno and Dr. Navar, the sole factor in causing plaintiff's 
CPM was the rapid elevation of sodium. Tr., Vol. I, p. 165, L. 16 - p. 166, L. 13. As noted 
above, and to borrow the language of counsel from the hearing, neither Dr. Navar nor 
Dr. Laureno knew to a reasonable degree of medical certainty whether the rise in sodium during 
"the period of time [Dr. Binnion] was treating [Mr. HaravrinJ" caused his CPM. See id., p. 
166, LL. 6-7. Similarly, neither Dr. Navar or Dr. Laureno have been able to state to a reasonable 
degree of medical certainty that any brain damage was caused before Dr. Hartford saw plaintiff 
at 1 1: 17 on the morning of November 15,2003. But for purposes of the Newberiy analysis, it is 
sufficient to note that, according to plaintiffs counsel, both Dr. Laureno and Dr. Navar believed 
that the cause of Mr. Harrison's CPM was the sodium replacement rate. As if to drive this point 
home, plaintiff also represented in his Appellant's Brief Cpp. 7, 49) that the "rapid elevation" of 
Mr. Harrison's sodium level was the sole cause of his CPM. Given Dr. Laureno's testimony and 
the representations made before this Court, plaintiff's reliance upon Newbery is both improper 
and misplaced. 
This Court previously held in Newbery that "the 'but for' test may be employed 
when there is a singlepossible cause." Newbevy, 142 Idaho at 288 (emphasis added). 
Accepting as true Dr. Laureno's testimony that the sole cause of Mr. Harrison's CPM was the 
"rapid elevation" of his sodium levels, and that the change in Mr. Harrison's sodium levels while 
he was under Dr. Binnion's care cannot be said to a reasonable degree of medical certainty to 
have caused that CPM, the only possible resolution of this case is entry of summary judgment in 
Dr. Binnion's favor. 
Assuming for purposes of summary judgment, however, that the substantial factor 
analysis is required, both of plaintiff's experts failed or refused to establish that the care provided 
by Dr. Binnion was a substantial factor in causing Mr. Harrison's injury. Dr. Navar stated during 
his deposition that defendant's alleged breach of the local standard of care "as identified above 
was a substantial factor" in causing plaintiff's CPM. R., Vol. 11, p. 327, Ex. 25, Ex. A, p. 50, 
LL. 12-14 (emphasis added). However, when lie was given the opportunity to male the causal 
connection between Dr. Binnion's alleged breach and Mr. Harrison's injury, Dr. Navar was 
forced to concede that'he "did not know" whether defendant's treatment was "enough to cause 
CPM in Mr. Harrison." Id., p. 106, LL. 7,20. Because he does not know if the care and 
treatment provided by Dr. Binnion caused plaintiffs CPM at all, Dr. Navar cannot say to a 
reasonable degree of medical certainty that Dr. Binnion's alleged breach of the local standard of 
care was "a substantial factor in causing" Mr. Harrison's injury. 
Similarly, Dr. Laureno was given an opportunity to opine on the substantial factor 
issue, yet he could not offer any admissible testimony against defendant either. Even though 
Dr. Laureno was clear in stating that there was but a single possible cause of plaintiffs injury 
(see R., Val. TI, p. 327, Ex. 30, Ex. A, p. 50, LL. 9-18), he was nevertheless asked: "Can you say 
that the change in Mr. Harrison's sodium levels during that period of time [from 12:49 to 
6:00 a.m. on November 15, 20031 was a substantial factor in causing (ylai~ztiff SJ CPM?'R., 
Val. 11, p. 327, Ex. 25, Ex. B, p. 123, LL. 22-25 (emphasis added). After carefully clarifying that 
the scope of his opinion dealt solely with the issue of whether the "rise in sodium, not the 
replacement of the sodium" was the cause of plaintiffs CPM, Dr. Laureno answered in the 
negative. See id., p. 124, LL. 14- 16, and p. 126, L. 25. 
The evidence of record establishes that neither of plaintiffs experts can say 
Dr. Binnion's care and treatment of Mr. Harrison caused his CPM, or even that such care was a 
substantial factor in causing his CPM. Thus, whether the Court applies a "but for" analysis, or a 
"substantial factor" analysis, the net result is the same: there is simply no evidence in this case 
that the rise in Mr. Harrison's sodium level caused or contributed to his CPM. 
4. The District Court properly determined that the remaining opinions 
of plaintiff's experts were speculative and would not assist the trier of 
fact. 
a. Evidentiary standard for an expert opinion. 
A motion for summary judgment requires that the court look to the threshold 
question of whether the evidence is admissible under Idaho Rule of Evidence ("I.R.E.") 702 
before moving on to the more liberal construction of Rule 56(c). This two-step process was 
described by this Court in Carnell v. Barlcer Management, 137 Idaho 322,48 P.3d 651 (2002): 
I.R.C.P. 56(e) provides that the adverse party may not rest upon 
mere allegations in the pleadings, but must set forth by affidavit 
specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. 
Rhodehouse v. Sutts, 125 Idaho 208,211,868 P.2d 1224, 1227 
(1994) (citation omitted). [. . .] "The admissibility of the evidence 
contained in affidavits and depositions in support of or in 
opposition to a motion for summary judgment is a threshold 
question to be answered before applying the liberal construction 
and reasonable inferences rule to determine whether the 
evidence is sufficient to create a genuine issue for trial." West v. 
Sonke, 132 Idaho 133, 138,968 P.2d 228,233 (1998). 
Carnell, 137 Idaho at 327,48 P.3d at: 656 (emphasis added). 
Idaho law requires that the court look at the underlying evidence when analyzing 
whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. Although Idaho has not formally adopted the 
reporting requirements of the federal Daubevt standard, Idaho courts similarly require the 
plaintiff to comply with the strict requirements of I.R.E. 702, which states in relevant part: 
If scientijic, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist 
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact 
in issue, a witness qualzjZed as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form 
of an opinion or otherwise. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Idaho courts uniformly hold that I.R.E. 702 requires an expert opinion to be 
founded upon "scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge" and must be based upon 
"factual foundation." Carnell, 137 Idaho at 328,48 P.3d at 657. "An expert opinion that is 
speculative or unsubstantiated by facts in the record is inadmissible because it would not assist 
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact that is at issue." Swallow, 138 
Idaho at 592 (citations omitted). If there is no factual foundation for an expert's opinion, then 
the evidence is not admissible under I.R.E. 702. Of course, without underlying evidence, there 
can be no genuine issue of material fact and a motion for summary judgment must be granted. 
b. Dr. Navar's implication of a causal connection is speculative 
and unsupported by any factual foundation in the record. 
Not only has plaintiff failed to offer evidence that the care provided by 
Dr. Binnion caused, or was a substantial factor in causing his injuries, he has failed to establish 
that defendant's other alleged breaches of the standard of care had a causative effect as well. 
Plaintiff argues that Dr. Binnion breached the local standard of care by "failing to properly 
communicate within her physician's orders, at the time they were written, her concerns about the 
rapid elevation of sodium and that all laboratory values be immediately communicated to the 
attending physician. . . ." Appellant's Brief, p. 50. This purported failure, he further argues, was 
a "substantial factor in causing" Mr. Harrison's CPM. Id. Similarly, plaintiff insists that 
Dr. Binnion's "fail[ure] to ensure that Mr. Harrison was admitted to the ICU unit" was also a 
"substantial factor in causing Mr. Hamson's injuries." Id., p. 52. These arguments depend 
entirely upon the underlying theory that if there had been "proper" communication within 
Dr. Binnion's physician's orders, or if Mr. Harrison had been "properly" admitted to the ICU, his 
sodium replacement rate would have been slowed and he would not have developed CPM.  Both 
of these theories require speculation on the part of plaintiffs experts, and as such, they are 
specious and unsupportable as a matter of law. Moreover, the alleged failures referenced in this 
section of plaintiffs argument go solely to whether there was a breach of the local standard of 
care, but do not establish that any such breach, even if proven, actually caused or contributed to 
plaintiffs injury. 
When asked specifically about his criticism on the communication issue, 
Dr. Navar stated that his only opinion was that Dr. Binnion's concern over rapid eltivation did 
not appear to be communicated to the nursing staff. See R., Vol. 11, p. 327, Ex. 25, Ex. A, p. 60, 
LL. 2-12. It is undisputed, however, that Dr. Binnion's concern in this regard was 
communicated in ~nultiple fonns. Dr. Binnion expressly noted her concerns over replacement 
rate in the Emergency Department Report: 
I have started an IV of nonnal saline and given the patient some 
potassiunl and Phenergan. I have spoken with Dr. Hartford, who 
is on call for Dr. Minus, and I will be admitting the patient into the 
hospital. I am going to go ahead and start him on normal saline 
boluses. I think that his sodium has taken quite some lime to get 
this low, and Ido  not want to replace it too quickly as that could 
cause cerebral edema. He will need probably thiamine and 
multivitamin replacements along with this. 
R., Vol. 11, p. 326, Ex. 17, Ex. 1, Bates No. 000562 (emphasis added). 
Dr. Binnion also testified about the discussion she had with Dr. Hartford, which is 
referenced in the Emergency Department Report: 
Q. Now, when you talked to Dr. Hartford, tell me everything 
you recall being discussed. 
A. I told him that the patient was hyponatremic. My 
recollection is that I initially said, "Let's put him on 
telemetry." 
And then he - at some point in the conversation it did come 
up that alcohol was an issue. And I think he suggested, you 
know, telemetry might be a little bit overstimulating for 
him. Do you think he would be okay on the floor? 
And I think I felt that he would be okay 011 the floor with 
the general medical treatment because he was looking - 
like I said, with the sodium being so low he really looked 
pretty good. So I think I understood his concern about, you 
know, the stimulus in the telemetry unit increasing his risk 
of having problems with the detox firom the alcohol. So we 
decided to put him on the medical floor. 
And I did discuss with him that I was going to continue 
his fluids at a rehydration rate and that I would be 
checking chemistries on a regular basis. And I asked him 
if the patient had anyproblems, would he be arourzd. 
And he said yes. 
Q. Okay. Do you recall anything else being discussed? 
A. You might jog my memory, but that's off the top of my 
head all I remember. 
Q. You said you'd continue fluids at a rehydration rate. Did 
you talk to him about what the particular rate was? 
A. I believe I said 200 cc an hour. 
Q. You specifically recall telling him that you had initiated 
orders of sodium replacement at 200 CCs an hour? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you inform Dr. Hartford that you had ordered two 
boluses of saline prior to initiating those order? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. Okay. Didyou indicated to Dr. Hartford how ofkn the 
chemical labs would be takerz? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what did you tell him? 
A. That they'd be every six hours. 
R., Vol. 11, p. 327, Ex. 25, Ex. C, p. 11 1, L. 8 - p. 113, L. 1 (emphasis added). 
The evidence adduced in discovery clearly shows that rather than failing to 
communicate her concerns over replacement rate and the need for monitoring of blood chemistry 
panels, Dr. Binnion noted such concerns in the chart and personally discussed them with 
plaiiltiffs attending physician. It should also be noted that whether or not defendant's concerns 
were verbally communicated to the nursing staff, her concerns over replacement rate were 
charted and discussed with the attendingphysician, and the sodium levels were being 
monitored by way of blood work every six hours. 
Dr. Navar further opined that Dr. Bimion's "failure" to ensure that Mr. Harrison 
was admitted to the ICU" was a "substantial factor" in causing his CPM. Dr. Navar 
acknowledged in his deposition that defendant, as the Emergency Department physician, did not 
have admitting privileges. R., Val. 11, p. 327, Ex. 25, Ex. A, p. 23, LL. 1-16. It has never been 
disputed that Dr. Binnion did not have admitting privileges at SARMC in November 2003. R., 
Val. 11, p. 282. Thus, regardless of her recommendation for placement, the admitting physician 
was the only person in a position to "ensure that Mr. Harrison was admitted to the ICU," and he 
was the only person with the ability to titrate the rate of sodium replacement. 
Finally, as noted above, plaintiffs argument that Dr. Bimion's "breach" ofthe 
standard of care was a "substantial factor" in causing plaintiffs injuries depends upon evidence 
that had defendant's concerns been communicated directly to the nursing staff, or had 
Mr. Harrison been admitted to the ICU, the sodium replacement rate would have been changed. 
First, such a position rests entirely upon conjecture, and no such opinion from plaintiffs experts 
would be admissible to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Secondly, the evidence in the 
record indicates that even if the alleged breaches had not occurred, the replacement rate would 
not have changed. There is no dispute that while Dr. Hartford did not see plaintiff at 6:00 a.m. 
on November 15, he did see plaintiff at 11: 17 that morning (see R., Val. 11, p. 326, Ex. 17, Ex. 1, 
Bates No. 000067), and after exanlining the patient and the chart, Dr. Hartford did not alter the 
sodium replacement rate. Accordingly, Dr. Navar's conclusory opinion that a change in 
plaintiffs care would have occurred had defendant "properly" communicated her concerns or 
"ensured" that plaintiff was admitted to the ICU is not only based upon pure speculation, but it is 
also contrary to the evidence of record. 
The standard of care opinions expressed by Dr. Navar are speculative at best. 
Furthermore, because those opinions merely assert, but do not establish a causal connection, 
there is no evidence to support aprima facie case for medical negligence. In light of the 
foregoing, the District Court's grant of summary judgment should be affirmed. 
V. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Respondent requests attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Rules 35 and 41 Idalto 
Appellate Rules, and Idaho Code Section 12-121. Under Idaho law, attorney fees may be 
awarded on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-121 if the "Court is left with the abiding 
belief that the appeal was brought or pursued frivolously, unreasonably, and without 
foundation." See Rowley v. Fuhrman, 135 Idaho 105, 110,982 P.2d 940 (1999). This Court has 
long held that attorney fees "are awardable if an appeal does no more than simply invite an 
appellate court to second-guess the trial court on conflicting evidence, or if the law is well settled 
and appellant has made no substantial showing that the district court misapplied the law." 
Johnson v. Edwards, 113 Idaho 660,662,747 P.2d 69 (1987). In other words, when a 
"dispassionate view of the record discloses that there is no valid reason to anticipate reversal of 
the judgment below," attorney fees should be awarded. Rueth v. State, 103 Idaho 74,81,644 
P.2d 1333 (1982). 
In this case, plaintiff has simply asked this Court to reevaluate the evidence or 
second-guess the District Court's well-reasoned decision granting defendant's motion for 
summary judgment. No substantial legal argument has been presented, and defendant should be 
awarded attorney fees on appeal. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, respondent respectfully requests this Court to affirm 
the District Court's entry of summary judgment and award defendant her attorney fees on appeal. 
DATED this 13th day of August, 2008. 
D. Lee Binnion, M.D. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case and  Course of Proceedings 
This is a medical negligence case in which Plaintiff-Appellant H. Ray Harrison also 
attempted to assert a claim for negligent granting of medical staff credentials against Defendant- 
Respondent Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc. (';Saint Alphonsus"). The primary 
issue in this appeal is whether the district court correctly ruled that the immunity provisions of 
Idaho's Peer Review Act bar a cause of action for negligent credentialing arising out of the 
ganting of hospital privileges to a physician. 
In his original complaint, filed on April 28, 2004, Harrison alleged medical negligence 
claims against Dr. D. Lee Binnion, Dr. Jeffrey and Saint Alphonsus, claiming that they 
had allowed his sodium levels to rise too quickly after he arrived at the Saint Alphonsus 
Emergency Department with dangerously low levels of sodium in his bloodstream. R. Vol. I, p. 
22-32. Dr. Hartford was the physician who admitted Harrison to the hospital and who treated 
him for several days thereafter. R. Vol. I, p. 24, q/ 10. On November 15, 2005, Harrison sought 
to arnend his complaint to include a claim for negligent credentialing against Saint Alphonsus. 
R. Vol. I, pp. 116-131. In the proposed amendment, Harrison alleged that Saint Alphonsus was 
negligent in allowing Dr. Hartford privileges to practice in its facilities. R. Vol. I, p. 126. Saint 
Alphonsus opposed this motion on the basis that 1.C. $ 39-1392c precluded such a cause of 
action. R. Vol. I, pp. 58-64. 
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The district judge heard Harrison's request to amend his complaint on April 6, 2006. Tr. 
pp. 54-103. The district judge indicated that she believed I.C. § 39-1392c did provide immunity 
from negligent credentialing claims, but indicated she would issue a written opinion on the 
subject. Tr. p. 91, L. 6-p. 92, L. 14, and p. 124, L1. 4-16. I-Iarrison thereafter filed a 
Supplemental Citatiou of Authorities, R. Vol. I, pp. 178-82, to which Saint Alphonsus respo~lded 
on April 20, 2006. Exhibit to R. #24. On May 18, 2006, the trial judge issued an opinion 
holding that the immu~lity provisions of I.C. § 39-1392c barred Harrison's claim for negligent 
credentialing. R. Vol. 1, pp. 183-213. 
The parties continued to litigate the re~nailling negligence claims. FIarriso~l settled with 
Dr. Hartford, and on August 25, 2006, the trial court dismissed Dr. Hartford from the case 
pursuant to the parties' stipulation. R. Vol. 11, pp. 249-50 and Exhibit to R. # 33 at Exhibit "A." 
On July 6, 2007, Dr. Bi~lnion obtained summary judgment. R. Vol. 11, pp. 280-99. Harrison and 
Saint Alpbonsus settled the remaining claims regarding nursing negligence. Confidential Exhibit 
to R. K1. This settlement, however, allowed Harrison to appeal the trial court's decision that the 
immunity provisions of I.C. $ 39-1392c barred his negligent credentiali~lg claim. Id. Tl~e  trial 
court entered final judgment on September 27,2007. R. Vol. 11, pp. 307-309. 
B. Statement of Facts 
This is not a case that requires the Court to make factual findings. The issue to be 
decided is purely legal -- whether the immunity provisions of Idaho's Peer Review Act preclude 
FIanison's claim for negligent credentialing. However, Saint Alphonsus disagrees with 
t-Iarrison's Statement of Facts, and is providing t.he following factual discussion for context. The 
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district judge also provided a detailed summary of the facts in her May 18, 2006 Order Denying 
Motions to Amcnd. R. Vol. I, pp. 204-209. 
Dr. Hartford is a family practice physician with a history of alcoholism and d ~ u g  
addiction. It. Vol. I, p. 204, L. 12. In 1995, he entered into the first of several stipulations with 
the Idaho State Board of Medicine designed to address these addictions. R. Vol. 1, p. 204, Ll. 
12-23. In 1997, following a licellse suspension, he entered into a contract with the Idaho 
Medical Association's Physician Recovery Network ("PRN). R. Vol. I, p. 205, L1. 5-7. The 
PRN is a "peer assistance entity" under I.C. 5 54-4401(2). R. Vol. I, p. 204, L1. 20-21, and 
Exhibit to R. #21 at 7 7. "Peer assistance entities" are organizations specifically created to 
address issues of "chemical dependency and/or impainnent, psychological impairment, and 
lnental or physical impairment" that affect members of the health care profession. I.C. 5 54- 
4401(2). Peer assistance entities such as the PRN "assist the board [of medicine] in performing 
its duties, implementing disciplinary actions or sanctions, and in addressing potential or 
confinned problems of chemical dependency andlor impairnlent" that affect health care 
professionals. 1.C. 5 54-4402(1). 
When a physician in the PRN is under stipulation with the Board of Medicine because of 
concerns about chemical dependency or other impairment, the PRN monitors the physician for 
the Board of Medicine. Exhibit to R. # 12 at Exhibit "C," p. 68, L. 14-p. 70, L. 15. If the 
physician has staff privileges at Saint Alphonsus, the ERN also provides the hospital with regular 
reports on his progress. Exhibit to R. # 21, 7 10. At all tinles relevant to this lawsuit, Dr. 
Hartford was a participant in the PRN, whose stipulations with the Board of Medicine required 
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him to submit to weeltly random urine screenings. Exhibit to R. # 12 at Exhibits " E  (Stipulation 
and Order at p. 3, and Second Amended Stipulation and Order at p. 3), and "C" at p. 25, L. 14-p. 
27, L. 8 and p. 103, LI. 19-21. See also, R. Vol. I p. 205, L. 22. 
The Saint Alphonsus Medical Staff Credentials Manual sets forth the peer review process 
the hospital undertakes when passing on applications for membel-ship to its medical staff. See 
Medical Staff Credentials Manual at pp. 1-17 (Exhibit to R. # 12 at Exhibit "D").' For 
physicians who have a history of alcohol or drug addiction, Saint Alphonsus's policies include 
adhering to the strictures of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") to determine whether 
such a physician can safely practice medicine.' See, Saint Alphonsus Medical Staff Policies and 
Plans at pp. 32-36 (Exhibit to R. # 12 at Exhibit " D ) .  Because of the PRN's special expertise in 
addressing issues of chemical dependency in practitioners, Saint Alphonsus relies upon the 
PRN's assessment of whether a physician in that program has recovered fro111 addiction to 
alcohol or drugs and can safely practice medicine. Exhibit to R. #21 at qjqj 4-12. Saint Alpilonsus 
followed its policies and procedures, including its policy of relying upon the PRN's 
recommendations, in credentialiilg Dr. Hartford in 2001, and in renewing his credentials in 2003. 
Id. 
When, in March of 2003, ail employee in the Saint Alphonsus credentialing office 
believed she smelled alcohol on Dr. Haitford's breath, Saint Alphonsus infonned the PRN. R. 
Vol. 1, p. 205, LI. 20-28, and Exhibit to R. K 12 at Exhibit "C," p. 89, L. 8-p. 91, L. 17. The 
I The refereticed Exhibit " D  contains several Saint Alphonsus policies and procedures. 
A pl~ysiciai~ denied staff privileges at a hospital may sue under Title 111 of the ADA even tliouglr he may not be a 
hospital employee. See, Levinger v. Mercy Medical Center, 139 Idaho 192, 198,75 P.3d 1202, 1208 (2003). 
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PRN informed the Board of Medicine, which required Dr. Hartford to submit to a drug and 
alcohol test and to undergo an evaluation at a treatment center in Louisiana (the "Palmetto 
evaluation"). R. Vol. I, p. 206, L. 1-5; Exhibit to R. K12 at Exhibit "D," p. 39, L. 21-p. 40, L. 16. 
The results of the alcohol test were inconclusive. R. Vol. I, p. 206, L1.-5. The Palmetto 
evaluation, which was provided to the PRN in March of 2003, expressed some reservations about 
Dr. Hartford's candor, but concluded that his addictions to both alcohol and drugs were "in 
re~nission." Exhibit to R. # 12 at Exhibit "D," p. 41, L1. 4-7 and p. 56, L. 14-p. 57, L. 6.3 Saint 
Alphonsus renewed Dr. I-Ia~tford's privileges in the summer of 2003, following the Palmetto 
evaluation and after the head of the Saint Alphonsus Medical Staff interviewed Dr. Elartford. R. 
Vol. I at p. 206; Exhibit to R. # l7  at Exhibit 3, p. 207, LI. 3-1 1 and p. 209, L. 1 - p. 210, L.G. 
On November 14,2003, Harrison arrived at the Saint Alphonsus Emergency Department. 
Dr. Binnion detennined that he was experiencing symptoms of profound hyponatremia. R. Vol. 
I, pp. 23-24. Dr. Hartford admitted Hanison to the hospital and treated him over the course of 
the following week. Id. In December of 2003, Saint Alphoilsus informed the PRN of a concern 
raised by Julie Anderson, Harrison's then-fiancbe, that she had smelled alcohol on Dr. Hartford's 
breath. R. Vol. 1, p. 209, LI. 1-2; Exhibit to R. # 12 at Exhibit "C," p. 196, L. 21 - p. 197, L 14. 
Saint Alphonsus informed the PRN, which in turn informed the Board of Medicine of the 
hospital's concern that Dr. Hartford might have relapsed. R. Vol. I, p. 209, L1. 1-6. This time, 
Although the Palmetto report was discussed in the testimony of witnesses at the Board of Medicine disciplinaly 
hearings, it has not been produced to the parlies in this case because the district court concluded that Dr. Hartford's 
medical records and PRN records were privileged. 
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the Board of Medicine obtained a positive alcohol test, and instituted disciplinary proceedings 
against Dr. Hartford. Id. See also Exhibit to. R. # l2  at Exhibit "C," p. 102, L. 9 - p. 108, L. 11. 
The Board of Medicine suspended Dr. Hartford's license for six months, and also ruled 
that his license would be revoked for five years if he continued to use alcohol or drugs. 
I-lowever, the hearing officer who presided over Dr. Hartford's disciplinary hearings stated, "the 
Board was not faced with a discipline case where the physician has presented a pattern of 
substandard care or of present endangerment to patients." R. Vol. I, p. 209, Ll. 6-29; Exhibit to 
R. # 12 at Exhibit "B," pp. 28-29. And, while this case has been presented by Harrison to this 
Court as involving the grant of privileges to a "dangerous" physician, Julie Anderson testified 
that while she believed Dr. Hartford smelled like he had been drinking the night before, she dicl 
not believe that he was intoxicated or impaired when he treated Harrison. R. Vol. I, pp. 206-208; 
Exhibit to R. # 12. In fact, in a related proceeding against Dr. Hartford's insurance carrier, 
Harrison himself has argued that there was actually no evidence that Dr. Hartford was ever 
intoxicated while treating him at Saint ~ l p h o n s u s . ~  
ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Section 39-1392c of Idaho's Peer Review Act provides immunity against liability 
for claims arising out of the receiving and "use" of information and opinions 1.elated to peer 
review. Given that privileging and credentialing are peer review activities under the Peer 
"n his settletllenl with Dr. Hartford, Harrison obtained an assignment of Dr. I-lartford's claims against his insurer, 
Lloyds of London. Exhibit to R. # 33 at Exhibit A. Excerpts of sutnlnary judgrncnt briefing in the case against 
Lloyds of London, in which Harrison asserted there was no evidence of intoxication, wel-e provided to the district 
court via the Affidavit of Elaine 1s. Lee filed on June 28,2007 (Exhibits 'Ti" and "1"). A Motion to Augmeiir the 
Record has been filed herewith to add this document to the Record on Appeal. 
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Review Act, is a hospital's act of granting privileges to a physician a "use" of peer review 
infonnation, thus providing it with immunity from claims for negligent credentialing brought by 
patients? 
2. Is Harrison entitled to appeal the district court's ruling that Dr. Hartford did not 
waive the doctor-patient privilege for inedical records he submitted to tlie Board of Medicine? 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COUI<T CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT IDAIIO'S PEER 
REVIEW ACT IMMUNIZES CLAIMS FOR NEGLIGENT CREDENTIALING. 
A. History of the Idaho Peer Review Act. 
Enacted in 1973, Idaho's Peer Review Act addressed a growing concern in the medical 
profession that effective self-criticism was being stifled due to the fear that peer review records 
would be discovered and subject to misinterpretation in subsequent litigation. See, Mzrvphy 11. 
PVood, 105 Idaho 180, 184, 667 P.2d 859, 863 (Ct. App. 1983) (discussing Statement of Purj>ose 
to 1973 Act). The Peer Review Act provides that records of pecr review proceedings are 
privileged, and not admissible "in any action of any kind in any court . . . for any purpose 
whatsoever." LC. 3 39-1392b. It also provides both health care organizations and individuals 
who participate in peer review with immunity for causes of action arising out of "the furnishing 
of information or provision of opinions" and the "receiving and use of such infonnation and 
opinions" related to peer review. I.C. 3 39-1392~. These broad protectiol~s of confideiitiality 
and immunity are "in the public interest because [they] encourage a free exchange of inedical 
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infonnation tliat will ultimately benefit the public in the fonn of improved medical care." 
Murphy v. Wood, 105 Idaho at 184,667 P.2d at 863. 
In 2003, the legislature substantially amended the Peer Review Act. The 2003 
arnendme~~ts added a number of activities co~nmonly conducted by hospitals, including 
credentialing and privileging, to the definition of peer review. The expanded definition of "peer 
review" now states in pertinent part: 
Peer review nieans the collection, interpretation, and analysis of data by a 
health care organization for the purpose of bettering the system of dclivel-y 
of health care or to irnprove the provision of health care or to othetwisc 
reduce patient morbidity and mortality and i~nprove the quality of patient 
care. Peer review activities by a health care organization include, without 
limitation. . . 
(a) Credentialing, privileging or affiliating of health care providers as 
members of, or providers for, a health care organizatioti. 
I.C. 8 39-1392a(l l)(a) 
B. The Immunity Provisions of I.C. § 39-1392c Prccludc a Cause of Action for 
Negligent Crcdentialing, Because, in the Context of Credentialing Activities, 
"Use" Can Only Mean "Using" Peer Review information to Grant or Deny 
Credentials. 
The Peer Review Act's immunity provisions appear in I.C. $ 39-1302~. They read: 
The furnishing of information or provision of opinions to any health care 
organization or the receiving and use of such inforination and opinions 
shall not subject any health care organization or other person to any 
liability or action for money darnages or other legat or equitable relief. 
Custodians of such records and persons becoming aware of such data and 
opinions shall not disclose the same except as authorized by rules adopted 
by the board of medicine or as otherwise authorized by law. Any health 
care organization may receive such disclosures, subject to an obligation to 
preserve the confidential privileged character thereof and subject further to 
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the requirement that such requests shall be made and such use shall be 
limited to aid the health care organization in conducting peer review 
1.C. § 39-1 392c. 
The relevant statulory directive is that the "receiving and use of such information and 
opinions shall not subject any health care organization or other person to any liability or action 
for inoney damages or other legal or equitable relief." The reference to "such information and 
opinions" can only mean "information and opinions related to peer review," because peer review 
is the subject of the Act. The question to he resolved on this appeal turns on the meaning of the 
word "use" in I.C. 5 39-1 392c. 
1.  Courts Interpret Statutes According to Their Plain Meaning, and if the 
Meaning is Clear There is No Occasion for Statutory Construction. 
Because statutory interpretation is a question of law, this Court exercises free review over 
the district court's determination that the Peer Review Act precludes a cause of action for 
negligent credentialing. See, e.g., Hanzilton ex rel. Hamilton v. Reeder Flying Svc., 135 Idaho 
568, 571, 21 P.3d 890,893 (2001). 
This Court has held that the language of the statute must be given its plain, obvious and 
rational meaning. If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, "the clear expressed 
intent of the legislature n~ust  be given effect and there is no occasion for construction." See, e.g., 
Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church ofJesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Ada County, 
123 Idaho 410, 415, 849 P.2d 83, 88 (1993). A statute is only ambiguous where reasonable 
minds might differ as to its meaning, and "[a]mbiguity is not present in a statute simply because 
the parties may present differing interpretations to the court." See, State 1). Doe, 140 Idaho 271, 
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274, 92 P.3d 521, 524 (2004). Ordinary words are to be given their ordinary meaning. See, e.g. 
Bunt v. City of Garden City, 118 Idaho 427, 430, 797 P.2d 135, 138 (1990). Also, "[Ejvery 
word, clause and sentence [in a statute] should be given effect, if possible." Matlev of Permit 
No. 36-7200 in Name ofIdaho Department of Park  and Rec. v. Higginson, 121 Idaho 819, 823, 
828 P.2d 848, 852 (Idaho 1992). 
"Unless the result is palpably absurd, this Court assumes the legislature meant what is 
clearly stated in [a] statute." See, e.g. State v. Parlcinson, 144 Idaho 825, 827, 172 P.3d 1100, 
1102 (Idaho 2007) (internal citations and quotations omitted). As the Court of Appeals has 
observed, so long as "rational reasons for [the legislation] can be readily disccrned," courts must 
refuse to interpret statutes in a manner that goes against their plain meaning. White v. Saint 
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 136 Idaho 238, 241, 31 P.3d 926, 929 (Ct. App. 2001). 
"[Ijf a law, as construed by the court, is to be changed, that is a legislative not a judicial 
function." Corpovatioiz ofpresiding Dish011 ofChurch of Jesus Chvist oflatter-Day Saints, 123 
Idaho 410,415, 849 P.2d 83, 88 (1993). 
2. The Immunity Provisions of the Peer Review Act Are Broad, Covering 
"Any Liability o r  Action" That Might Arise Out of the Use of Peer 
Review I~~formation. 
Applying these rules to I.C. 5 39-1392c, there can be no doubt that the grant of innnunity 
is intended to apply broadly. The statute clearly states that the "receiving" and "use" of peer 
review information "shall not subject any health care organization or other person to any liability 
or action for money damages or other legal or equitable relief." I.C. 5 39-1392c. This is not 
language that allows for exceptions, or that limits the classes of lawsuits to which immunity 
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applies. See, Von Lindevn v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 94 Idaho 777, 779, 498 P.2d 34, 347 
(1972) (holding that the word "any" in a statute indicates something "selected without restriction 
or limitation of choice, . . . without exception; one, no matter what one; all" (quoting Emmolo v. 
Southern Pacific Co., 204 P.2d 427 (1949)). See also, Kauntz v. HCA-Healthone LLC, 174 P.3d 
8 13, 8 18-8 19 (Colorado App. 2007) (holding that Colorado's peer review act granting hospitals 
immunity fkom "any" civil action arising from a professio~lal review action encoinpassed a claim 
for negligent credentialing). To conclude, as Harrison urges, that the language of I.C. $ 39- 
1392c was not intended to reach negligent credentialing claims by patients would be to engraft a 
judicial exception onto the legislature's broad grant of immunity. 
Throughout his brief, Harrison asserts that the legislature could not have intended to 
provide blanket immui~ity from negligent credentialing claims. This assertion is untenable. 
Because Idaho's Peer Review Act provides that health care organizations shall not be subject to 
"any liability or action, " it creates not just a defense to liability, but irn~nunity from suit. The 
effect of this immunity is to shield the deliberative process of peer review coin~nittees from 
second-g~~essing in litigation. Lf the Court concludes that a hospital that grants staff privileges 
does so by "using" peer review information, then it follows that the immunity provisions of I.C. 
$ 39-1.392~ must apply to negligent credentialing claims. 
3. The Plain Meaning of the Word "Use" as i t  Appears in the Peer Review 
Act Includes a Decision to Grant o r  Deny Credentials. 
The dictionary definitions of the vei-b "to use" confilm that the most common definition 
of that word Incans "to einploy or utilize for a particular purpose." For example, the Compact 
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Oxford English Dictionary defines "use" as meaning "to take, hold, or deploy as a means of 
achieving something." See, www.askoxford.coin/concise~oed/use; (Appendix A to Respondent's 
Brief.) Other related definitions include "to employ for some purpose, put into service," or "to 
carry out a purpose or action by means of." See, WEBSTER'S UNIVERSAL COLLEGE DICTIONARY 
at p. 866 (1997), and www.merrian1-webster.com/dictionary/use (Appendices B and C, 
respectively, to Respondent's ~rief). '  The United States Supreme Court has held, in the context 
of the federal arson statute, that "the word 'use,' in legislation as in conversation, ordinarily 
signifies 'active empioyment."' Jones v. United States, 529 9J.S. 848, 855, 120 S.Ct. 1904, 1910 
(2001). The Ninth Circuit has also defined the word "use" as meaning "to put into action or 
service, avail oneself of, employ." Af-Cap., Inc. v. Chevron Overseas (Congo), L td ,  475 F.3d 
1080, 1088 (9th Cis. 2007) (interpreting word "use" in context of the waiver provisions of the 
Foreign Sovereign immunity Act) 
"Use" in the sense of "active employment" or "putting into action or service" is precisely 
the detinition that the district court ascribed to the word. The district court explained: 
St. Alphonsus, as a health care organization, is immune from civil suit for 
the use of inJoun2ation in credentialing a physician. While the Hall-isons 
suggest that "use of information" does not create immunity for the act of 
credentialing, their contention is nonsensicaI. The Court cannot agree 
with the Harrisons' strained interpretation. The Harrisons' logic would 
place this Cou~t  in the untenable position of granting St. Alphonsus 
immunity for reading the material but simultaneously holding St. 
Alphonsus liable for using the contents read by the committee in the 
material when granting or denying credentials. As St. Alphonsus 
I While there are other delinitions of the word "use," they include "to consume, expend, or exhaust," "to treac or 
behave towards," "to take unfair advantage of;" or "to drink, smoke, or ingest habitually." These definitions make 
no sense in the context of the Pecr Review Act. 
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contends, the act of issuing the credential is the ullimate use of 
cvedentialing material. 
R. Vol. I, p. 190, L1. 15-21. The district court also observed that by definition, immunity relates 
to actions taken or decisions made. The trial judge stated, "The Court can imagine no tort claim 
arising from the mere reading of or handling of such material. Irnlnunity would only be 
necessary to immunize actions taken. If 'use o f  does not include the act of credentialing, it 
would be superfluous." R. Vol. 1. p. 190, L1. 12-21. 
C.  The Immunity Provisions of I.C. $39-1392c Are Not Ambiguous. 
In an effort to overcome the plain language of I.C. $ 39-1392c, Harrison argues that the 
statute is ambiguous. However, he failed to make this argu~nent in the trial court, where he 
clainled that the statute unainbiguously did not preclude a cause of action for negligent 
credentialing. Tr. p. 63, LI. 17-19. Because Harrison has raised this issue for the first time on 
appeal, the Court should decline to consider it. See, Highlands Development Corp. v. City of' 
Boise, -- P.3d -, 2008 WL 2437838 at '8 (Idaho 2008). 
111 any case, the argulnent that the statute is ainbiylous should be rejected. Harrison 
attetnpts.to draw a distinction between "use" of peer review information and "decisions" about a 
doctor's credentials, but this is a false dichotomy. As the district court noted, the decision to 
grant or deny privileges is the ultimate "use" of peer review information obtained during the 
credentialing process. If, as the dictionary definitions and case law suggest, "use" means "active 
e~nploy~nent o f '  or "carrying out a purpose by means of," i t  is broad enough to encompass 
"decisions" made by using peer review information in the peer review process. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
It is not necessary for the statute to state that immunity shall he provided for "decisions to 
grant or deny credentials" in order for it to encompass negligent credentialing claims. The 
legislature could not anticipate and identify every lawsuit that might arise from the peer review 
process. The Peer Review Act encompasses a wide variety of hospital activities. The statute 
clearly covers not only retrospective disciplinary hearing -- "peer review" in the traditional sense 
of the word -- but credentialing and privileging, "quality assul-ance and improvement, patient 
safety investigations, patient adverse outcolne reviews, and root cause ai~alysis investigations." 
I.C. $39-1392a. Given the scope of thc statute, it would be difficult to address all possible 
claims that could arise from each kind of peer review activity. The answer to this dileinma is to 
craft a general, but broad, immunity provision. The grant of immunity for "receiving" and "use" 
of peer review informatioil accomplishes this goal. 
"When a statute's language is broad enough to include a particular subject matter, an 
intent to exclude it from the statute's operation must be specifically expressed." Idaho Home 
Health, Inc, v. Bear Laice County, 128 Idaho 800, 802, 919 P.2d 329, 331 (1996). The Court 
should not infer an intent to exclude negligent credentialing causes of action simply because the 
iinniunity provisioris are worded generally and broadly. Breadth is not ambiguity. 
D. Enforcing the Statute According to its Plain Meaning Does Not Lead to 
Absurd Results. 
Harrison also suggests that providing immunity for negligent credentialing claims would 
contradict the pu'pose of the Peer Review Act or lead to absurd results. This is not the case. In 
Kazmlz, supra, the Colorado Court of Appeals rejected the idea that granting imrnullity for 
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negligent credentialing claims was inconsistent with the purpose of the Colorado peer review act. 
Kaunlz at 817-19. The court observed that the statute would only bar claims where the hospital 
actually conducted peer review prior to granting staff privileges, not claims where the hospital 
failed to have a peer review process in place or failed to conduct peer review at all. Kauntz, 174 
P.3d at 819. The same conclusion is true of Idaho's Peer Review Act. Immunity for "using" 
infonnation can only exist if a hospital has a peer review process in place, and if it uses that 
process prior to granting staff privileges to a physician. Granting immunity ensures that 
hospitals conduct peer review, because they can hardly claim immunity for causes of action 
based on the "use" of peer review infonnation if they do not conduct peer review at a1L6 
Further, the immunity provisions of I.C. 5 39-1392c do not distul-b a patient's ability to bring 
traditional negligence lawsuits against doctors, or against hospitals for the negligence of their 
employees. 
The Kazlntz court also discussed a nunlber of other reasons why granting immunity for 
negligent credentialing claims was co~lsistent with the goal of peer review. Anlong these reasons 
were that 1) it would encourage physicians to participate in peer review proceedings; 2) 
negligence claims are likely to be reduced when the medical community polices its own conduct; 
and 3) providing immunity would assure that the privileges remain intact. ICauntz, 174 P.3d at 
817-19. The court stated, "it would be inconsistent to preclude a patient's discovery of peer 
Harrisoli has not alleged that Saint Alphonsus failed to have a peer review process in place or that it failed to 
conduct peer review prior to granting Dr. Hariford credentials. Rather, he asserted that the substantive decision to 
grant Dr. Hartcord credentials was ~~egligetit in light of his history of alcohol and drug abuse. R. Vol. I, p. 126,n 40; 
Exhibit to R. K 15 a lp .  17. 
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review documents dealing with an allegedly negligent physician, but still allow that patient's 
negligent crcdentialing claim to be asserted. If such a claim were allowed, both patients and 
hospitals would he at distinct disadvantages in proving their claims or defenses." Id. at 81 8. The 
court ultimately concluded that, far from being an "absurd" result, immunity for negligent 
credentialing claims was a rational, sensible ineans of furthering the goal of peer review. 7 
Providing immunity froin all kinds of lawsuits, including negligent credentialing claims, 
is a rational means of achieving the objectives of the Peer Review Act. Public policy decisions 
such as this are the business of the legislature. Xufing v. Ada County Paramedics, _- P.3d -, 
2008 WL 2357686 at * 3-4 (June l l ,  2008) 
E. This Court has Already Limited the Scope of Judicial Review of the 
Credentialing Decisions of Peer Review Committees. 
In an analogous context, this Court has limited the scope of judicial review of a hospital's 
decision to deny staff privileges. Miller v. Saint Alphonsus, 139 Idaho 825, 87 P.3d 934 (2004), 
involved a lawsuit by a surgeon who was denied staff privileges at Saint Alphonsus. When the 
surgeon applied for privileges, a number of doctors expressed reservations abont aspects of his 
history that suggested an rnability to work harmoniously with other professionals. Saint 
Alphonsus conducted an in-depth, multi-step investigation regarding these concerns, and 
ultimately denied the request for privileges. Id, 139 Idaho at 828, 87 P.3d at 937. This Court 
7 Contrary to Harrison's suggestion, Saint Aiphonsus is not suggesting that immunity should somehow be inferred 
from the existence of the peer review privileges. The immunity from negligent credeutialing claims comes frorn the 
plain langilage of I.C. 5 39.1392~. For this reason, the cases Harris011 cites in which courts refused to llold that 
negligent credeiltialing claims were abrogated by the existence of peer review privileges are inapposite. See, e.g, in  
i-e Zarrimore v. Vaughn Reg% /Wed C'nti,., lnc ,  768 So.2d 374 (Alabama 2000); Greenwood v. CYierdsma, 741 P.2d 
1079 (Wyoming 1987); Szm 1fefll1h Corp. v. Superior Corp., 70 P.3d 444 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003). Here, there is no 
occasion to "infer" that the Idaho legislature intended to bar negligent credentialing claims, because it did so 
expressly. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF Page 16 
limited the scope of judicial review of the decision denying privileges lo a deter~nination that 
there was an appropriate process in place to ensure that the doctor had received basic due process 
protections. It refused to consider whether there was a sufficient basis for the decision. See id., 
139 Idaho at 832-835; 87 P.3d at 941-944. 
While Miller did not involve a negligent credentialing claim by a patient, it stands for the 
proposition that Idaho courts will not second-guess the substantive decisions of peer review 
committees. While hospitals in Idaho must conduct peer review, including physician 
credentialing, there is no provision of law that dictates precisely how this must be done or that in 
any way circumscribes the substantive decision-making freedom of peer review committees. 
I.C. 5 39-1392f provides: 
Every hospital subject to this act shall cause the hospital's medical staff to 
organize in-hospital medical staff coinmittees which shall have the 
respotlsibility of reviewing the professional practices of members of the 
hospital's medical staff for the purpose of reducing morbidity and 
mortality, and for the improvement of the care of patients in the hospital. 
This review shall include, but not be limited to, the quality and necessity 
of care provided to patients. 
The Idaho Administrative Code also contains a broad requirement that hospitals conduct peer 
review prior to granting staff privileges. IDAPA 16.03.14.200.01.d & 16.02.14.250 
Idaho Code 39-1395 provides that, subject to requirements that applicants for staff 
privileges be afforded due process, hospitals retain full authority to set rules, standards, and 
qualifications For ~nedical staff membership, and to @-ant or refuse incdical staff me~nbership as 
they see fit. This statute provides in pertinent part: 
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Except as otherwise provided in this section, no provision or provisions of 
this section shall in any way change or modify the authority or power of 
the governing body of any hospital to makc such rules, standards or 
qualifications for medical staff membership as thcy, in their discretion, 
may deem necessary or advisable, or to grant or refuse inembership on a 
medical staff. 
The process for considering applications for medical staff membership and 
privileges shall afford each applicant due process. 
These statutes, regulations, and this Court's interpretatiou of the law in Miller v. Saint 
Alphonsus, demonstrate that while there is an obligation to conduct peer review according to a 
process detennined appropriate by the hospital, courts will not second-guess decisions to grant or 
deny credentials to a physician. Put colloquially, the message to hospitals is, "You are required 
to conduct peer review, but how you do it is up Lo you. You have discretion to make decisions 
about granting or denying hospital priviIeges as you see fit, and courts will not second-guess 
these decisions in lawsuits alleging an improper grant or denial of credentials." 
F. Whether a Cause of Action for Negligent Credentialing Exists !Must Be 
Decided in Light of Idaho's Unique Peer Review lmmur~ity Provisions. 
1. Immunity, Not Common Law Duty, is the Issue. 
It1 the trial court, liarrison relied upon cases from a nulnber of jurisdictions that have 
imposed upon hospitals a colnmon law duty to take steps to verify the competence of physicians 
seeking membership on their nledical staff. R. Vol. I, p. 178-182. However, the vast majority of 
these cases did not discuss the issue of statutory immunity from negligent credentialing clain~s. 
The trial judge conducted a painstaking review of the peer review statutes in every single state 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
for which Harrison provided a citation, and concluded that they all varied markedly from Idaho's 
unique statute. R. Vol I, p. 192-202. To summarize the trial judge's conclusions, some states 
only provide immunity to physicians or individual peer review committee members, but not to 
hospitals. Some states' peer review immunities only apply to claims brought by physicians, not 
to claims brought by patients. Some statutory schemes do not consider credentialing activities to 
be peer review, and some state peer review acts do not contain i~nmunity provisions at all. Id. 
Given the strictures of Idaho's unique act, immunity, not duty is the issue. The question 
in this appeal is not whether hospitals "should" or "ought to" conduct peer review prior to 
granting credentials. The legislature has already decided that such peer review is desirable. But 
it has also determined that the best way to ensure that meaningful peer review occurs is to shield 
the process, its participaxts, and its conclusions fi-om second-guessing in litigation. Stated 
simply, there is a "duty," just not one that gives rise to a private tort claim 
2. Cases Discussing the lmmu~xily Issue are Informative, But Not 
Controlling. 
Saint Alphonsus is aware of only a handful of cascs that address whether state peer 
review statutes provide immunity fron~ negligent credentialing claims. The outcomes depend 
entirely on the language of the particular peer review statute at issue. Taken together, these cases 
stand for the proposition that where the statutory lanbmage is clear, peer review statutes can and 
do provide imnlunity from negligent credentialing claims on the same basis that they provide 
immunity against other causes of action 
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The most recent case finding immunity is Kauntz, which has been discussed previously. 
While the Colorado statute at issue there was not identical to Idaho's, there were some 
similarities. Mainly, the operative grant of immunity was broadly worded, providing hospitals 
with immunity for damages arising "in any civil action with respect to their participation in, 
assistance to, or reporting of information to a professional review body in connection with a 
professional review action." Kauntz, 174 P.3d at 8 17. 
Peer review statutes in Texas and Ohio statutes also restrict clai~ns for negligent 
credentialiug. The Texas statute provides health care entities with immu~lity from claims arising 
"from any act, statement, determination or recommendation made, or act reported, without 
malice, in the course of peer review." See, Sl. Lulce's Episcopal Hospital v. Agbor, 952 S.W.2d 
503, 505-507 (Texas 1997) (citing TEXAS REV. CIV. STAT. ANN., art. 499% 5 5.06(1) & (m)). In 
Agbov, the Texas Supreme Court refused to restrict the scope of this language or infer a 
legislative intent to exempt negligent credentialing claims. Id. 
Ohio has recently amended its peer review statute to specifically address negligent 
credentialing clain~s, with the result that they are eliminated in all but the narrowest 
circumstances. In Ohio, a hospital is now presumed not to be negligent if, at the time that it 
credentialed the physician, it was accredited by the Joint Cornrnissioli on Accreditation of 
Healthcare Organizations or another similar entity. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2305,2Sl(B)(l). 
Courts in Virginia, Georgia, Illinois, and Minnesota have declined to find immunity, as 
did Ohio courts under ail older version of Ohio's peer review act. However, these courts were 
considering statutes very different from Idaho's. In Stolllemyer v. Ghvamm, 60 Va. Cir. 474, 
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2001 WL 34084307 (Virginia 2001), the court concluded that Virginia's statutory immunities 
extended only to members of and consultants to peer review entities, and not to hospitals. Id. at 
$4 (construing Va. Code Ann. 5 8.01-581.16). Browning v. Burt, 613 N.E.2d 993 (Ohio 1993) 
declined to find itnmunity for similar reasons, holding that an older version of the Ohio statute 
granted immunity to hospitals only where they participated as a member of a peer review 
committee. Browning, 613 N.E.2d at 1006-1007. The former version of the Ohio statute also 
provided that "[nlothing in this section shall relieve any individual or hospital from liability 
arising from treatment of a patient." Id. In contrast, Idaho's statute clearly applies to "health 
care organizations," and does not contain an exception for patient lawsuits. I.C. 39-1392~. 
Further, the Ohio legislature has recently amended the peer review act to severely restrict the 
scope of negligent credentialing c la i~ns .~  
The Georgia Supreme Court has held that Georgia's peer review act does not provide 
immunity from claims for negligent credentialing, but the basis of its holding was that 
credentialing of doctors is not "peer review" under Georgia's act. See, McCall v. Henry Medical 
Center, Inc., 551 S.E.2d 739, 742-43 (Georgia 2002) (construing OCGA $ 3 1-8-131(1)). 'The 
Illinois statute at issue in fiigo v. Silver Cross Hospital and Medical Center, 876 N.E.2d 697 
(Ill. App. Ct. 2007) contained an ar~wabiy broad grant of immunity, but also stated that 
"[n]otlring in this Section shall relieve any individual or hospital from liability arising from 
treatment of a patient." Id., 876 N.E.2d at 720, 315 111. Dec. 385, 408 (2007) (citing 210 ILCS 
85J10.2). Idaho's statute does not contain such a limitation. 
For this reason, the unpublished opinion in Phillip.~ t i  Burl, 1995 W L  353861 (Ohio App. 1995), which Harrison 
claixns broadened the holding of Browning v. Burl, is no longer good law. 
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Finally, in Larson v. Wasemiller, 738 N.W.2d 300 (Minn. 2007), the Minnesota Supreme 
Court concluded that because the Minnesota pecr review act only provided immunity for actions 
or recominendations based on "reasonable" beliefs fonned after "reasonable" efforts to ascertain 
the facts, it could not complelely bar negligent crcdentialing claims. The court observed, "if the 
legislature had intended to foreclose the possibility of a cause of action for negligent 
credentialing, it would not have addressed the standard of care applicable to such an action." Id. 
at 331. Idaho's statute contains no such language. 
All of these cases -- whether they recognized or rejected immunity -- simply underscore 
the fact that decisioils about immunity for negligent credentialing claims must be made in light 
of the specific language of a particular state's pecr review act. In Idaho, the clear, unambiguous, 
and broad grant of immunity against claims arisiug fvotn the "use" of peer review information 
forecloses the possibility of a cause of actioii for negligent credentialing. The purpose of this 
immunity is not to protect hospitals. It is to ensure, consistent with the goal of the Peer Review 
Act, that the public receives the best possible liospiial care. 
11. THE COURT SHOULD DECLlNE TO REVIEW DISCOVERY ORDERS 
THAT CONCERNED DR. EIARTFORD. 
In the trial court, Harrison requested that Dr. Hartford produce certain medical records 
that were submitted to the Idaho State Board of Medicine in connection with the disciplinary 
hearings that took place in May of 2004. Dr. Hartford asserted, aucl the district court agreed, that 
these were subject to the doctor-patient privilege aud that he had not waived the privilege by 
submitting the records to the Board of Medicine. R. Vol. I, pp. 108-1 10. Saint Alphonsus 
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respectfully submits that the Court should decline to address this issue. The discoverability of 
Dr. Hartford's treatment records was an issue that arose between Harrison and Dr. Hartford, not 
between Hamson and Saint Alphonsus. The district court dismissed all the claims against Dr. 
Hartford with prejudice, pursuant lo the parties' stipulation. Saint Alphonsus is not in a position 
to argue the merits of the district court's decision on the discoverability of Dr. Iiartford's 
medical records, but il does believe that such issues should not be decided in his absence. 
CONCLUSION 
The plain language of the Idaho Peer Review Act's ilnnlunity provisions precludes a 
cause of action arising out of the "use" of peer review information. 111 the context of 
credentialing decisions, this means "using" peer review information to grant or deny privileges. 
The statute, though broad, is not ambiguous, and providing immunity from negligent 
credentialing clair~~s furthers the purpose of encouraging robust peer review aud ensuring that the 
process remains confidential. The decision of the district court should be affinned 
k DATED this 13 day of August, 2008. 
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC 
V~ttorneys for Defendant-Respondent Saint 
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center 
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use 
verb /yooz/ 1 take, hold, or deploy as a means of achieving 
something. 2 (use up) consume or expend the whole of. 3 
treat in a particular way. 4 exploit unfairly. 5 /yoost/ (used to) 
did repeatedly or existed in the past. 6 lyoostl (belget used 
to) be or become familiar with through experience. 7 informal 
take (an illegal drug). 
- noun /yooss/ 1 the action of using or the state of being 
used. 2 the ability or power to exercise or manipulate 
something: he lost the use of his legs. 3 a purpose for or way 
in which something can be used. 4 value; advantage. 
- PHRASES have no use for.inforrnai dislike or be impatient 
with. make use of use. 
-ORIGIN Old French user, from Latin uti. 
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use - Definition from the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary 
: Main Entry: =Use ad 
/ Pronunciation: \'yiiz\ 
: Function: verb 
/ Inflected Form(s): used \'yiizd, in the phrase 
/ "used to "usually Iyiis(t)\; ussing dx> \'yii-ziq\ 1 / Date: 14th century 
i transitive verb 
: I archaic : ACCUSTOM, HABITUATE 
; 2 : to put into action or senrice : avail oneself 
of: EMPLOY 
3 : to consume or take (as liquor or drugs) regularly 
4 : to carry out a purpose or action by means 
: of : UTILIZE; also : MANPU~LATE 2b <used him 
i selfishly> 
i 5 : to expend or consume by putting to use ---often 
/ used with up 
j 6 : to behave toward : act with regard to : TREAT 
i <used the prisoners cruelly> 
j 7 : %m- Id <the house could use a coat of paina 
! intransitive verb 
j 1 -used in the past with to to indicate a former fact 
i or state <we used to go more often><didnlt use to 
smoke> 
: 2 : to take illicit drugs regularly 
I synonyms m, EMPLOY, UTILIZE mean to put 
: into service especially to attain an end. implies 
: availing oneself of something as a means or 
i instrument to a1 end <willing to use any means to 
achieve her ends>. EMPLOY suggests the use of a 
person or thing that is available but idle, inactive, or 
disengaged <looking for better ways to employ their 
skills>. UTILIZE may suggest the discovery of a 
new, profitable, or practical use for something <an 
old wooden bucket utilized as a planter>. 
